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Debate over the concept of law currently contrasts conceptual and interpretive
accounts. This Article begins to elaborate a social-scientific conception of law as a
subset of a concept of a governance structure. To begin, it distinguishes institutional
structures, realized institutions, and functioning institutions. Governance structures
consist of institutional structures that perform central tasks of governance. Dworkin's
interpretive conception of law extends over the domain of functioning institutions;
positivist, conceptual accounts of law extend over the domain of institutional structures. From this perspective legal systems may be best understood as governance
structures that satisfy the political value legality; different concepts of law offer different accounts of the value of legality and its relation to other political values of justice.
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The starting point of this Article is Richard Posner's statement of regret (in 1975)
that, in terms of legal scholarship, "normative analysis vastly preponderates over positive," and that this can be corrected by the economic analysis of law. I consider that
the positive, predictive contribution of law and economics is still undervalued. Lawyers, practitioners and academics, have much to learn from economic analysis because
so often they fail to understand the nature of the interaction between law and market
phenomena. This Article explores three areas of analysis to justify this contention: the
interplay between public and private incentive systems to induce behavioral change;
the ex ante, ex post dilemma in the application of legal rules; and comparative law and
rule-formulation.
The second part of the Article shifts to what may be described as the explanatory
or interpretative function of law and economics Traditionally legal scholarship has
centered on promoting the coherence and systematic orderliness of the law and the
explanatory approach can make a major contribution to this. Because law and economics cuts across traditional legal conceptual structures, and indeed legal systems
and cultures, it provides a valuable tool for understanding the relationship between
different parts of the legal systems and between different systems. More controversially, I also contend that an economic interpretation helps to resolve the ambiguities
and uncertainties that inevitably arise when legal entitlements are based on notions of
morality and corrective justice.

THE UNEXPECTED GUEST: LAW AND ECONOMICS,
LAW AND OTHER COGNATE DISCIPLINES,
AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Thomas S. Ulen

403

This Article argues that law and economics has worked a remarkable but unexpected change on legal scholarship. Many critics mistakenly claim that the most notable effect of law and economics lies in its conclusions about substantive legal rules.
This Article argues that this criticism misses the far more radical effect of law and
economics on the study of law-namely, its commitment to the scientific method of
inquiry, a method that relies upon theorizing, then performing empirical work to verify or refute the theory, and then refining the theory in light of the results. The Article
explains why this change has occurred, what paths it is likely to travel in the near
future, and how this effect of law and economics is likely to be more lasting and
profound that the effects of other recent innovations in legal scholarship, such as law
and society and law and philosophy. Law and economics' changes on the prevailing
norms and methods of legal scholarship has brought law schools more firmly within
the scholarly traditions prevailing in other academic disciplines within research universities but may have distanced the work of law professors from the concerns of the
legal profession.
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Functional law and economics, which draws its influence from the public choice
school of economic thought, stands as a bridge between the strictly positivist and normative approaches to law and economics. While the positive school emphasizes the
inherent efficiency of legal rules and the normative school often views law as a solution to market failure and distributional inequality, functional law and economics recognizes the possibility for both market and legal failure. That is, while there are
economic forces that lead to failures in the market, there are also structural forces that
limit the law's ability to remedy those failures on an issue-by-issue basis. The functional approach then uses economic tools to analyze market and legal behavior in
order to create meta-rules which limit the extent of the failures in each realm. These
meta-rules are designed to induce individuals to reveal their preferences in cases
where collective choices are necessary, and to internalize the effects of their actions
generally. This mechanism design or functional approach to law and economics focuses on ex ante social welfare maximization, rejecting both the ex post corrective
function of law assumed by the normative school of thought and the naturally evolving
efficient system view espoused by the positive school.
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This Article argues that various philosophically interesting objections to the use
of public choice theory in legal education are misguided. Some writers hold that public
choice theory, being descriptive, cannot help law students develop the interpretive
skills needed by judges and lawyers. I reply that this objection rests on the false assumption that public choice theory lacks resources to accommodate rule following.
Others object that public choice theory fosters cynicism and uncooperative attitudes.
This rests on an unduly restrictive conception of the theory of rationality presupposed
by public choice analysis. The public-choice focus on efficiency has also been disputed.
In reply, the author shows that (i) Pareto efficiency is arguably a necessary requirement of distributive justice, (ii) we may have a moral duty to teach wrong principles,
and (iii) public choice theory is instrumental to the realization of any ideal of distributive justice. The author also addresses Anthony T. Kronman's objection that legal
education should be about case-by-case balancing, and as such makes no room for
public choice analysis. The author's reply is that familiarity with public choice theory
helps students identify the territories where genuine legal argument, rather than op-

portunistic bargaining, holds out hope of being persuasive. Finally, against those critics
that allege that public choice theory is predictively inaccurate, the author shows that
this shortcoming, even if genuine, need not prevent the theory from spotting hidden
factors or guiding us towards institutions that economize on virtue.
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SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL
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This Article offers a "legal analysis of economics" in contradistinction to the prevailing "economic analysis of law." The economic problem that forms the subject matter of the theoretical legal analysis is the problem of rational commitment. The
difficulty here is that an agent can have a reason, or a preference, to commit to do
something that he will have no reason actually to do, or which will be contrary to
preference when the time comes actually to do it. Familiar examples include the problem of making credible threats or promises.
This Article develops an account of the rational actor that differs from that conventionally supplied by rational choice theory to handle this problem. Borrowing from
some work by the philosopher-economist John Broome, the Article argues that rational decision-making involves more than acting on the balance of reasons, or allthings-considered preferences; it also consists in following the normative requirements
of practical rationality. After articulating the logical distinction between reasons and
normative requirements, the Article argues that this richer account of the rational
actor is manifested in common law adjudication and, more particularly, in the special
relationship that exists between decided cases and defeasible legal rules. The Article
suggests that this is exactly the sort of rationality that the economist needs to comprehend, and solve, the problem of rational commitment.
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The recent debate on what criteria ought to guide social decision-making has focused on consistency: it has been argued that criteria contradicting one anothernamely, welfare and fairness-should not be simultaneously employed in order for
policy assessment to be consistent. This Article raises the related problem of completeness-that is, the question of whether or not a set of consistent criteria is capable
of providing answers to all social decision problems. If not, as it is suggested might be
the case, then the only way to decide otherwise undecidable issues is to simultaneously
employ both welfare and fairness, which implies a certain degree of inconsistency
within the system.
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COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE
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This Article discusses the relative value of law and economics and moral philosophy to explain private law in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. It argues
that the recent philosophical paradigm, which revolves around the ideas of fairness
and autonomy, is intellectually continuous with the School of Rationalist Natural Law.
Though this School has been directly influential on the development of civilian private
law, its ascendancy on common law cannot be documented. Paradoxically, recent philosophical explanations of private law bear on common law, while legal philosophers in
civil law jurisdictions still follow Kelsen's research agenda, which focuses on the structural properties of law.
The Article seeks to show that the relative importance of law and economics and
moral philosophy to explain private law varies depending on the jurisdiction. In civil
law jurisdictions, moral philosophy is more important because civilian institutions,
such as contracts and torts, have been shaped by the ideas of autonomy and fairness.
In common contract and tort law, however, those moral ideas have been relegated to a
peripheral position. The Article provides illustrative examples and emphasizes that
law and economics is also necessary to explain many features of civil law.
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PROFESSIONAL WORKFORCE

For professionals, work is not a commodity to be sold on the market, but a calling
that constitutes personal identity while simultaneously conferring a relatively privileged class status. Historically, the professions avoided commodification through a social bargain in which they exchanged their professional expertise and dedication to
public service for autonomy, the ability to self-regulate through peer review, and monopoly power over their knowledge base. Over the last twenty-five years, market instability and technological development have fundamentally altered the conditions
under which this social bargain was formed, and the professional class has been transformed from self-employed to salaried employee status. New profit-maximizing strategies and updated scientific management techniques are threatening to commodify
professionals and generating widespread interest in professional unions. This Article
examines the forces that are prompting unionization in the medical profession and the
legal profession, assesses unionization and collective bargaining as effective vehicles
for the defense of professional identity, addresses potential barriers posed by the
Court's interpretation of the labor laws, and outlines an argument for coverage of
professionals by the NLRA that is grounded in the commodification process.
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The employee benefits picture, at least for many plan participants and some plan
sponsors, is a scary and bleak one. The number of workers with pension coverage is
declining, health insurance rates are rising much faster than the rate of inflation, and
the number of uninsured continues to rise as well. The decline in union density, the
recent boost given by the U.S. Supreme Court to Any Willing Provider ("AWP") laws,
and the deluge of recent benefits-related scandals are also all part of this landscape.
This Article examines each of these issues, with a focus on reforms that would increase
pension and health insurance coverage rates.
The first argument is that the path toward reform will be profoundly affected by
the nature of the conversation about the problems employers and employees face in
trying to reach an optimal level of benefits coverage. The Article proposes the adoption of a non-emotional, non-value laden framework that takes into account the stark
economic realities both parties face. The problem of declining union density and its
implications for the assertion of employee bargaining power are considered next. With
respect to health insurance, the Article looks at recent experience with small employer
purchasing groups and makes a controversial proposal that employees be permitted to
trade cash for benefits. Finally, the Article asserts that in cases of fraud and malfeasance (highlighted by recent scandals) the core problem is one of sub-optimal deterrence. The solution is an amendment to ERISA that would permit a punitive damage
sanction in cases of egregious employer/plan sponsor behavior.
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The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") generally requires employers to
"reasonably accommodate" a "qualified" employee's disability. Unfortunately, the
ADA is silent as to the appropriate method for fashioning reasonable accommodations. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued regulations
endorsing an "interactive process" by which an employer and its "qualified" disabled
employee work together to devise the proper accommodation. However, the Supreme
Court has yet to determine whether courts must defer to these regulations, leaving the
circuit courts of appeals to issue differing opinions on whether the EEOC's interactive
process is best characterized as a requirement or merely a suggestion.
Thus, the circuits appear to be split over the issue of liability for a failure to
engage in the EEOC's interactive process. However, upon close examination, there is
no circuit conflict. The EEOC regulations are not written in mandatory terms and are
best understood as not imposing independent liability for a failure to interact. Further,
no circuit truly mandates that employers interact, and the ADA itself would not permit such a mandate. On that basis, while interaction with a disabled employee can
prove both prudent and valuable, an employer is not required to interact when fashioning a reasonable accommodation for its disabled employee.
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This Note discusses Enron's lockdown of its 401(k) plan, the effect this decision
had on Enron employees' pension funds, and the legal implications of this decision
under the current statutory framework, ERISA. It describes the lawsuit filed by Enron employees in an attempt to recover some of the lost funds, as well as the
probability of success for that action specifically and similar actions under ERISA in
the future.
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States should be treated as market participants and not be given sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment when they are acting as private employers.
Through an expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has
restricted the right of state employees to sue under federal statutes intended to protect
employees when the state is the employer and claims sovereign immunity. Under the
market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, if a state is acting as a
market participant, rather than as a market regulator, it is no longer bound by the
restraints of the Commerce Clause. The reasons states acting as employers should be
treated as market participants rather than sovereigns are as persuasive as the arguments supporting the market participant exception. This doctrine should be transferred by analogy from its exclusive application in the dormant Commerce Clause
context to include instances when states are acting as employers and thus, market

participants. Traditionally, the market participant exception has worked to states' benefit, allowing them to act in the same capacity as a private company without Commerce Clause concern. As an employer, a state is not acting in its regulatory capacity.
Rather, it is acting as a private actor. Therefore, it should be treated as a market
participant and should not be able to evade regulation by claiming sovereign immunity. If states are going to enjoy the same benefits as private employers, they ought to
be subject to the same limits as well.
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The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a trial before a jury. Until
the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, however, nine states wholly or partially
surrendered a portion of the jury's role to a sentencing judge. Specifically, those states
allowed sentencing judges to make factual determinations regarding sentencing considerations by which capital defendants became eligible for the death penalty. The
Ring Court halted the use of sentencing considerations to erode the jury's fundamental role in preserving accuracy and fairness of criminal proceedings, holding that the
Sixth Amendment requires that a jury make factual findings on all elements, including
sentencing consdcrations. Most courts considering the extent to which the rule in
Ring will be available to those capital defendants already sentenced have held that
Ring is unavailable to those defendants whose cases have become final. This Comment
analyzes Summerlin v. Stewart, the recent Ninth Circuit case now pending before the
Supreme Court. The author argues that the Summerlin court correctly held that, as
both a substantive and a procedural rule, Ring must apply retroactively on collateral
review.
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David K. Lutz

This Note examines whether precluding a plaintiff from claiming reasonable reliance on representations made outside of a final written agreement containing a nonreliance clause violates Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
Note uses the Third Circuit's recent decision in AES v. Dow Chemical Co. to put the
issue in context, and concludes that the court reached the wrong conclusion. By accepting the assumptions of law and economics, and addressing the arguments against
such an approach from behavioralists and other critics, the Note argues that adopting
a clear rule enforcing non-reliance clauses produces certainty in contractual dealings,
leads to efficient outcomes, and will reduce the occurrences of fraud. As opposed to
adopting a standard recognizing investors' cognitive vulnerabilities, this Note advocates for the adoption of a clear rule enforcing non-reliance clauses to preclude reasonable reliance as a matter of law against sophisticated parties in an arm's length
transaction.
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